

UTIMACO

Quantum Computer Age Security

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August 5, 2025


Creating Trust in
the Digital Society

utimaco[®]

- 1 Tech trends & market size
- 2 Short intro: Quantum computer
- 3 Post Quantum Computer Age Security
 - PQC
 - Crypto agility
 - QKD
 - Quantum randomness
- 4 Addressing the Quantum Threats to the PKI system and application
- 5 Utimaco strategy and research involvement
- 6 Industry Organization and Standard
- 7 CSNA 2.0 and NIST Timeline
- 8 u.Trust GP HSM, PQC Ready and ESKM, QKD Ready
- 9 Use case



Tech trends influencing UTIMACO's products & solutions – Quantum Computer Age Security influences most other technology trends





Market size



2030
Q Sec: **\$10 bn***

Time relevancy



2 – 10 years

Fields to play



PQC



Crypto Agile



Randomness






QKD

* <https://thequantuminsider.com/2022/02/02/the-quantum-insider-report-forecasts-quantum-security-market-worth-10-billion-by-2030/>

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Traditional computer with 2 bits – sequential representation of numbers 0 – 3


$[0,0] \rightarrow 0$
 $[0,1] \rightarrow 1$
 $[1,0] \rightarrow 2$
 $[1,1] \rightarrow 3$



1 0 2 2 1 3 0 2 0 1 3 0 2 ...

Quantum computer with Qubits – representing the values 1 or 0 and everything in between, simultaneously.

$[0,0] \rightarrow 0$
 $[0,1] \rightarrow 1$
 $[1,0] \rightarrow 2$
 $[1,1] \rightarrow 3$
...and more!



01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 ...
23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23

Traditional computer – 1 state at a time

Traditional 1 and 0
as determined states



Either 1 or 0

2 Bits: 4	3 Bits: 8
00	000
01	001
10	010
11	011
	100
	101
	110
	111

Quantum Computer – all states at a time



Various states in parallel

2 qBits: 4	3 qBits: 8
00	000
01	001
10	010
11	011
	100
	101
	110
	111

Qubits interact
with each other
which improves
the processing
speed of quantum
computers.



Entanglement

Qubits exist in
more than one
state or location
simultaneously.



Superposition

Problem Statement

◆ Shor's Algorithm **breaks asymmetric crypto**

- ◆ Breaks **RSA** by quickly factoring large numbers
- ◆ Breaks **Elliptic Curve Cryptography** and **Diffie-Hellman** by solving the discrete log problem


◆ Grover's Algorithm **weakens symmetric crypto**

- ◆ Square-root speedup on search algorithms
- ◆ **Weakens** symmetric encryption and hashing **by 50%**

Type	Algorithm	Key Strength Classic (bits)	Key Strength Quantum (bits)	Quantum Attack
Asymmetric	RSA 2048	112	0	Shor's Algorithm
	RSA 3072	128		
	ECC 256	128		
	ECC 521	256		
Symmetric	AES 128	128	64	Grover's Algorithm
	AES 256	256	128	

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PQC safe algorithms

Quantum Key Distribution

- ◆ Kyber
- ◆ Dilithium
- ◆ XMSS

Crypto agility

Quantum Randomness

Hybrid crypto

A photograph of Utimaco hardware components, including a circuit board with a "CryptoServer" label and a rack-mounted server unit with the "utimaco" logo.

Store now, decrypt later




Digital signatures may be broken



Mosca theorem

- ◆ **X** = Number of years to protect specific data
- ◆ **Y** = number of years needed to convert to Quantum Computer Age security
- ◆ **Z** = number of years until Quantum Computer can break today's crypto



What algorithms are available to address digital signatures and KEM?

Your choice of algorithms

Key Encapsulation / Encryption

Algorithm	Method	Status	Recommendation
ML-KEM	Lattice-based	NIST Standard published: FIPS-203	ML-KEM-1024 for all classification levels
HQC	Code-based	NIST Selected Algorithm to be Standardized	N/A
Classic McEliece	Code-based	NIST PQC Standardization Round 4	N/A
Bike	Code-based	NIST PQC Standardization Round 4	N/A
Frodo-KEM	Lattice-based	Not standardized Recommended by German Federal Office for Information Security	N/A

Digital Signatures


Algorithm	Method	Status	Recommendation
ML-DSA	Lattice-based	NIST Standard published: FIPS-204	ML-DSA-87 for all classification levels
SLH-DSA	Hash-based	NIST Standard published: FIPS-205	N/A
FALCON	Lattice-based	NIST Selected Algorithm to be standardized	N/A
LMS / HSS	Stateful Hash-based	Standardized NIST SP 800-208	All parameters approved for all classification levels. LMS SHA256/192 is recommended
XMSS / XMSS-MT	Stateful Hash-based	Standardized NIST SP 800-208	All parameters approved for all classification levels
SHA family	Hash function	Standardized FIPS PUB 180-4	Use SHA-384 or SHA-512 for all classification levels

Take away: There is no magic bullet!

You need to consider which cryptographic use cases you have in your organization and test which PQC algorithm fulfills this use case in your environment. **Most of the algorithms will not be a 1:1 replacement.**




Crypto agility






**Different
Key
Lengths**



**Different
Algorithms**

Digital Signature	Dilithium	Falcon	SPHINCS+	...
KEM	Kyber			


**Flexible
Interface**



Variable parameters

Different message sizes

Fields for additional information




Quantum Key Distribution



QKD Use Case



Solutions



Highly Secure Key Generation


- ♦ Randomness by **entangled photons**
- ♦ **Eavesdropping** can be **detected**
- ♦ Source must **not be trusted**
- ♦ Longer **transmission distances** when send from satellite

System set up

- ♦ Due to limited transmission distances, **HSMs and Key Management Systems for endpoints** and transmission needed

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


Definition of hybrid methods

- Hybrid use of cryptography allows to combine classical and PQC algorithms
- Can be used for deriving hybrid keys or digital signatures
- Should either of the two algorithms show weaknesses, there is still the other algorithm to rely upon


Method 1

- ♦ Execution of classical and post quantum key exchange (or use of pre-shared secrets)
- ♦ Combination of both results in Key Derivation Function (KDF)



Method 2

- ♦ For signature schemes, signatures can be concatenated and both signatures need to be valid



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Summary: Utimaco to position in 7 areas to address Quantum Computer Age Security holistically



Research projects with Utimaco involvement – building out infrastructure, know how and brand



		Project	Utimaco share	Status
QKD	Q-Fiber & Q-net-Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> German wide QKD network via satellite Prevent side channel attacks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Secure processing of keys in HSM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Waiting for approval
	ISQKMS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of Quantum Key Mgt. System 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Secure processing of keys in HSM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Running
	QCNTF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> QKD network specification for Singapore 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Utimaco specifying key mgt. layer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completed
PQC	QRCrypto	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PQC systems for different industries (e.g. space, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HSM/ Key Mgt. support for various use cases 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Application in finalization

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Shaping Tomorrow's Cryptographic World

NIST

PQC Consortium:
Work Streams Interoperability,
Discovery



X9 Post Quantum
Cryptography Committee



ETSI Quantum-Safe
Cryptography (QSC) Working
Group



Federal Office for Information
Security in Germany

GSMA™

PQC Working Groups



PQC Consortium: PQC
Workstream



White House Roundtable,
January 2024



bitkom

And further



White House Roundtable on PQC,
August 2024



ICMC,
September 2023




Post-Quantum Cryptography Conference,
November 2023

Playing a key role in shaping the future landscape of Post Quantum Cryptography

FROST & SULLIVAN

2024 Frost & Sullivan
🚢 **Competitive Strategy Leadership Award**

The Global Post-Quantum Cryptography Industry
Excellence in Best Practices



FROST & SULLIVAN
BEST PRACTICES
AWARDS

“Utimaco’s expertise in deploying HSMs both for general purpose and specialized use cases translates well to the post-quantum era, which requires high levels of customization and adaptability. An integral part of the migration to PQC as a supplier of roots of trust, Utimaco also strategically positions itself as a wide-ranging partner for organizations in this monumental task, providing consultancy services, quantum-readiness assessments, and crypto-agility solutions.”

- Özgün Pelite, Sr. Industry Analyst

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RSA-2048 is only considered secure
until 2030.

(guidance in NIST SP 800-78-5)

NIST IR 8547 Transition to PQC Standards

(Published November 2024)

Table 2: Quantum-vulnerable digital signature algorithms

Digital Signature Algorithm Family	Parameters	Transition
ECDSA [FIPS186]	112 bits of security strength	<i>Deprecated</i> after 2030 <i>Disallowed</i> after 2035
	≥ 128 bits of security strength	<i>Disallowed</i> after 2035
EdDSA [FIPS186]	≥ 128 bits of security strength	<i>Disallowed</i> after 2035
RSA [FIPS186]	112 bits of security strength	<i>Deprecated</i> after 2030 <i>Disallowed</i> after 2035
	≥ 128 bits of security strength	<i>Disallowed</i> after 2035

Regulatory Initiatives Around the World on PQC

Country	PQC Algorithms Under Consideration	Published Guidance	Timeline (summary)
Australia	NIST	ACSC-2023 ACSC-2024	Start planning for transition to quantum resistant cryptography.
Canada	NIST	CAN-01 CAN-02	Start planning, wait for standards. CSE is updating detailed PQC guidance.
China	China Specific	CAICT-2023	Start Planning
Czech Republic	NIST (but not restricted to)	NÚKIB-2023	Migrate by 2027 (key establishment, encryption). As soon as possible for firmware & software signing.
European Union	NIST Plan to select PQC EU algorithms	ENISA-2022 EC-2024	Start planning Define a coordinated PQC roadmap for Member States by 2026
France	NIST (but not restricted to)	ANSSI (2022, 2023)	Start planning; Transition from 2024
Germany	NIST (but not restricted to)	BSI-2021 BSI-2023 BSI-2024	Start planning
Italy	NIST	CAN-2024	
Japan	Monitoring NIST	JAPAN-2022	Start planning; initial timeline. CRYPTREC is preparing detailed PQC guidelines.
Netherlands	ML-KEM, Classic McEliece and FrodoKEM recommended in hybrid mode for TLS.	NL-2022 AIVD-2023 NL-2024	Draft action plan with timeframes
New Zealand	NIST	NZISM-2024	Start planning. Transition from 2026-27.
Singapore	Monitoring NIST	SG-2022 MAS-2024	No timeline available. Financial services firms required to prepare plan.
South Korea	KpqC	MSIT (2022) MSIT (2024)	Start competition First round (Nov.'22-Nov.'23). PQC Roadmap published
Spain	NIST and FrodoKEM.	CCN.ES-2022	Four phase approach today to post-2030.
United Kingdom	NIST	NCSC-2024a NCSC-2024b	Start planning; use only standards in production. NCSC is preparing detailed PQC guidance.
United States	NIST	NSM-10 CISA-2021 CNSA20 HR7375 CISA-2023 CISA-2024	Implement 2023-2033

*<https://www.gsma.com/newsroom/post-quantum-government-initiatives-by-country-and-region/>

CNSA 2.0 Requirements and Timeline

Software and firmware signing


- ◆ LMS
- ◆ XMSS

General quantum-resistant public key algorithms


- ◆ Key-establishment: CRYSTALS-Kyber (ML-KEM)
- ◆ Digital signatures: CRYSTALS-Dilithium (ML-DSA)

Symmetric key algorithms

- ◆ AES
- ◆ SHA



 Option and testing

 CNSA Suite 2.0 default and preferred



Exclusive use of CNSA Suite 2.0

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The Cloud-inspired, Next Generation HSM

Superior Performance ♦ Multi-Tenant ♦ PQC-ready
♦ FIPS-certified ♦ SDK ♦ Free Simulator



Up to 40,000 RSA 2K operation / s



Multi-tenancy with up to 31 containers



Designed crypto agile




FIPS 140-2 Level 3 certified (FIPS 140-3 in progress)



SDK for custom implementations



Free, fully functional simulator



Up to 31 partitions

- ♦ General Purpose HSM (e.g. FIPS / Non-FIPS)
- ♦ Payment HSM
- ♦ SDK - customized
- ♦ Blockchain
- ♦ PQC

Containerization




Config and policy per container




Firmware per container



Prepared for Quantum-secure Use Cases – Already in Use Today



Securing the Access to Data and Information at Different Levels



Key Manager with broad integration portfolio



Secure

- ◆ Meet NIST standards, validated to **FIPS 140-2 Level 1-4, Common Criteria**
- ◆ Encrypts keys in transit and at-rest
- ◆ Certificate-based authentication and built-in CA

Interoperable

- ◆ **Support OASIS KMIP** (Key Management Interoperability Protocol)
- ◆ Support RESTful interface
- ◆ No vendor lock-in
- ◆ Custom integrations using SDK

Available

- ◆ **Active-Active** cluster with thousands of nodes
- ◆ **Automatic key replication**, client failover
- ◆ **Highly redundant** hardware

Scalable


- ◆ Geographically **separated clusters** across datacenters
- ◆ Supports thousands of clients, and **millions of keys**

Managable

- ◆ Configuration and keys replicated across cluster automatically
- ◆ **Hands-off administration**, automated backups and audit logging



Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)



Advanced REST Settings

Enable ETSI QKD 14:	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ETSI QKD 14 Port:	7443
ETSI QKD 14 CA:	Local: ESKMCA

- ETSI GS QKD 014 V1.1.1 (2019-02) titled “**Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Protocol and data format of REST-based key delivery API**”
 - Three API commands
 - Get Status
 - Get Key
 - Get Key IDs
 - API Data format for those 3 API commands
- These REST APIs enable an SAE to request & get keys from a KME within THE SAME Trusted Node (TN)

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Use Case: Digital Signatures to Secure Satellite Communication

Quantum-proof digital signatures and encryption for long-term secure satellite communication

Project: Securing **Satellite Communication**

- ➔ Providing fast, affordable broadband to unserved and underserved communities around the world


CCSDS Space Data Link Security Protocol requires cryptographic algorithms for

- ◆ Authentication
- ◆ Encryption
- ◆ Authenticated encryption

Algorithms and methods used

- ◆ XMSS incl. state handling (signatures)
- ◆ CRYSTALS-Kyber (key encapsulation mechanism)

Keys are generated in the HSM with private keys never leaving the HSM



Solution:

u.trust General Purpose HSM Se-Series upgraded with Quantum Protect + SDK

Use Case: Key Injection for Long-term Secure Firmware Updates

Securing firmware updates for Chips using PQC

Algorithms

- ◆ CRYSTALS-Dilithium (signatures)
- ◆ CRYSTALS-Kyber (encryption)

Methods used

- ◆ Generation of CRYSTALS-Dilithium key pair in the HSM
- ◆ Cryptographic key injection (Public Dilithium key) during chip manufacturing
- ◆ Signature verification in the field
- ◆ Confidentiality achieved by encrypting with CRYSTALS-Kyber


Challenges solved

- ◆ Memory space on the chips
- ◆ Protection against side channel attacks

Customer:

NXP Semiconductor industry


World leader in secure connectivity solutions for embedded applications



Solution: **Utimaco u.trust General Purpose HSM Se-Series** upgraded with **PQC algorithms** + **SDK** for custom firmware



SDK





Thank you for your attention!



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